By Sophie Lindqvist

On 9 October 2026, the United States sanctioned the International Criminal Court as an institution — the first time it targeted the Court itself rather than individual prosecutors or judges. Several MEPs and member states, including Belgium, now want the European Union to invoke its blocking statute (a regulation that shields EU entities from third-country extraterritorial laws) to neutralize the sanctions. The European Commission has said it will "take any necessary measures to enable the Court to carry out its work" — possibly an implicit reference to the statute.

The stakes are existential. The sanctions will make it extremely difficult for the ICC to access services essential to its day-to-day operations. And the United States has built in a six-month grace period before many of the measures take effect.

What does the blocking statute actually do?

The mechanism is simple. First, it makes foreign court judgments that give effect to extraterritorial laws unenforceable in European courts. Second, it prohibits EU operators from complying with the foreign law unless they obtain a waiver. Think of it as a legal firewall: US sanctions judgments simply cannot pass through EU courtroom doors.

Brussels has used the tool sparingly. Only twice, in fact — to block certain US sanctions on Cuba and Iran.

Why the 2014 tax fight matters here

This is not the first time the EU has threatened tough action against US extraterritorial law. In 2014, the United States unilaterally imposed an extraterritorial tax reporting regime on EU financial institutions. Those institutions must report account information of US persons to the Internal Revenue Service. The United States does not reciprocate: it does not compel US banks to share account information of EU persons with European tax authorities.

The asymmetry is exploitable. EU persons can use it to avoid paying tax at home.

The EU tried to fix this through the Common Reporting Standard (CRS), a multilateral framework for reciprocal exchange of tax information. In 2018, it threatened to put the United States on its blacklist of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions if Washington kept refusing reciprocity. The deadline came. The United States still had not joined the CRS. The EU backed down.

What happened when the EU blinked?

The consequences were measurable. A 2022 European Parliament report floated using the blocking statute against US extraterritorial tax reporting — pressure Washington to join the CRS or lose access to US taxpayer account information held in Europe. Neither the Commission nor the Parliament acted on it. As a result, the source argues, the United States has become the world's worst tax haven, ranking as the top secrecy jurisdiction for European countries. Secrecy laws in states such as South Dakota let Europeans hide money from their own tax authorities. EU banks, meanwhile, keep paying compliance costs for US reporting obligations.

The lesson is blunt: empty threats do not deter Washington. The source draws the parallel directly — ambiguous threats to invoke the blocking statute are unlikely to convince the United States, just as the 2018 blacklist threat was ignored. Invoking the statute before the six-month grace period expires, by contrast, would strengthen the EU's negotiating hand and signal real commitment to the Court.

Do EU member states have a legal duty to protect the ICC?

Possibly, and on several grounds.

• The 2006 Agreement Between the ICC and EU on Cooperation and Assistance. Article 4 commits both to "cooperate closely" to facilitate "the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities." Article 14 obliges the EU to provide services to the ICC as needed.
• Host-state obligations. The ICC sits on EU territory, with the EU and the Netherlands as hosts. Even absent a treaty, host states are "obliged to facilitate the work of the organization as much as possible." The Netherlands' headquarters agreement adds a duty to ensure the "freedom of financial assets from restrictions."
• Membership duties under the Rome Statute. Every EU member state is a party to it. Members of an international organization must "support the organization loyally in its functioning" — a duty of loyal membership rooted in the general principle of cooperation, pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept), and good-faith treaty performance.

Given the existential threat, the source argues all EU member states, acting jointly as ICC members, arguably have a legal obligation to protect the Court.

What would coordinated action look like in practice?

Without the blocking statute, enforcement becomes a patchwork. Individual member states and their national courts would each weigh the enforceability of US sanctions. Some governments might block enforcement nationally. Others might leave it to judicial discretion, with outcomes hinging on whether the sanctions fit national public policy. That risks an inconsistent response across Europe.

Invocation changes the picture immediately: the US sanctions would become unenforceable in every court across the European Union, in one stroke.

The EU also need not act alone. Other Rome Statute parties, such as Canada — flagged as a potential EU associate member — have their own blocking statutes they could deploy in concert. Those states carry the same protective obligations toward the ICC.

What does this mean for practitioners?

The six-month window is the operative deadline. Compliance teams at EU banks, payment processors and service providers dealing with the ICC should track whether Brussels invokes the statute before the grace period expires, because the answer determines whether US sanctions are enforceable in their jurisdictions. If the statute is invoked, EU operators face a direct compliance conflict: following US sanctions without a waiver would itself violate EU law. If it is not, expect divergent national court rulings on enforceability and public policy. The 2018 blacklist episode suggests the credible threat only works if the EU is prepared to pull the trigger.

The broader pattern, the source concludes, is one of unilateral US extraterritorial impositions — in tax and now in international criminal law — met largely with impunity. The ICC, whatever its flaws, faces dismantlement by a state that is not even a party to the Rome Statute.